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EXPLORING CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
James E. Orescanin*
INTRODUCTION

T

he Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) is a federal regulatory agency that is tasked with regulating thousands of products which pose a risk of injury or death to the public.1 The effects that dangerous consumer products have on the
public’s well-being are staggering, and it is estimated that the damage from these products cost more than one trillion dollars annually.2 To ensure products are safe for public use, the CPSC primarily relies on voluntary standards which are developed by product
manufacturers, businesses, or other organizations as opposed to
being created by the CPSC itself.3 This is because the legislature
has made it clear that the CPSC is to primarily rely on voluntary
standards as opposed to issuing its own mandatory standards.4 Although the CPSC does have the authority to promulgate mandatory
safety standards in the event it is necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of injury, it generally will only do so if no feasible
standard would adequately protect the public.5 If the voluntary
standards in place would eliminate or adequately reduce the risk
of injury addressed and it is ‘likely’ that the manufacturers will

* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law.
1
15 U.S.C.A § 2051(b)(1) (West 1972).
2
About CPSC, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N.,
http://www.cpsc.gov/About-CPSC (last accessed Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter “CPSC About Page”].
3
Contact/FAQ, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N.,
https://www.cpsc.gov/About-CPSC/Contact-Information (last accessed
Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter “FAQ Page”].
4
15 U.S.C.A § 2056(b)(1) (West 1990).
5
FAQ Page, supra note 3.
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comply with those standards, the CPSC is to refrain from issuing
safety standards of its own.6
In addition to regulating safety standards, the CPSC is also
charged with issuing product recalls when products have violated
a mandatory safety standard, or are otherwise defective.7 The
CPSC can technically issue both mandatory and voluntary recalls.8
Voluntary recalls are more common and involve the CPSC working jointly with the manufacture to implement a voluntary recall
of the defective product.9 In contrast, mandatory recalls are rare
and require the CPSC to file an action in district court against the
manufacturer of a dangerous product, the product itself, or both,
and show that the product is “imminently hazardous.”10 In association with its claim, the CPSC can pray for such relief as a recall,
repair or replacement of the product, or public notification of the
risk to the product’s purchasers.11
After bringing an action in federal court, the CPSC may
also order the manufacturer to cease distribution of the product or
to notify all purchasers of the substantial risk the product poses.12
In addition to filing such action, the CPSC must then initiate a proceeding to promulgate a consumer product safety rule applicable
to the product.13 In assessing whether a product poses a substantial
risk, the CPSC relies on disclosures from product manufacturers,
and from reports from consumers and consumer organizations.14
This Note will explore the CPSC’s effectiveness as a regulatory agency. Under current legislation, the CPSC has several inadequacies which pose problems to the public’s well-being. This
Note seeks to explore these limitations and present potential solutions to address them. Part I of this Note will examine the history
and founding of the CPSC. Part II will discuss the two most significant changes that have affected the CPSC throughout history. In
Part III, this Note will examine the CPSC today, focusing on its

6

15 U.S.C.A § 2056(b)(1) (West 1990).
FAQ Page, supra note 3.
8
Leslie Cornell, Product Liability and Internet Prevention: The CPSC
Online Consumer Database, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 254, 278 (2011)
[hereinafter “The CPSC Online Database”].
9
Id. at 263.
10
15 U.S.C.A. § 2061 (West 1990).
11
15 U.S.C.A. § 2061(b)(1) (West 1990).
12
15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(c)(1) (West 1990).
13
15 U.S.C.A. § 2061(c) (West 1990).
14
15 U.S.C.A. § 2064 (West 2008).
7
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shortcomings and the effects that these issues have on the public.
Finally, in Part IV, this Note will offer proposed solutions which
seek to improve the CPSC’s regulatory ability.
I. THE CREATION OF THE CPSC

A. Establishing the Commission
In 1967, Congress passed a joint resolution establishing the
National Commission on Product Safety (“NCPS”) to conduct a
comprehensive study of consumer product hazards.15 In 1970, the
NCPS issued its Final Report and found that consumers were excessively exposed to unreasonable products hazards, and recommended a new federal independent agency be created.16 This was
largely due to the fact that, at the time, consumer product safety
was regulated almost exclusively at the state level, causing significant standard discrepancies amongst manufacturers.17 Thus, in
1972 Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act (the
“CPSA”), which established the CPSC as an independent regulatory agency with federal jurisdiction.18

B. Jurisdiction
Under the CPSA, Congress gave the CPSC expansive jurisdiction to cover most products used by the average consumer.19
The term “consumer product,” of which the CPSC has authority to
regulate, was defined to include any “article” produced or distrib-

15

Pub. L. 90-146, Nov. 20, 1967, 81 Stat. 466 (as amended by Pub. L.
91-51, Aug. 4, 1969, 83 Stat. 86) available at http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/90/146.pdf.
16
Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A
Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 32, 36
(1982). (Specifically, the NCPS found that around twenty million people
were injured every year as a result of incidents in and around the home, at
a cost of over $5.5 billion) [hereinafter “A Flawed Product”].
17
Michelle Boyer, Consumer Product Safety Commission CPSC History, US RECALL NEWS (May 30, 2008), https://www.usrecallnews.com/us-consumer-product-safety-commission-cpsc/.
18
15 U.S.C.A. § 2051 (West 1972).
19
Pub. L. 92-573, Oct. 27, 1972, 86 Stat. 1207 § 3(a)(1) [hereinafter
“The Consumer Product Safety Act”] current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §
2052(a)(5) (West 2008).
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uted for sale to a consumer for use in a home, school, or for recreation, personal use, or enjoyment.20 The CPSA also gave the CPSC
the authority to enforce existing safety standards which regulated,
among other things, hazardous substances, children’s toys, and
flammable fabrics.21 With this expansive coverage, it was estimated that ten thousand consumer products and over one million
producers and sellers of such products, fell under the CPSC’s jurisdiction.22
Despite the broad definition of “consumer products,” the jurisdiction of the CPSC was not limitless. The CPSA laid out specific products which were excluded from CPSC jurisdiction, including food, drugs, cars, tobacco, and firearms.23 Most of the
excluded products were already regulated by sister agencies, such
as the Food and Drug Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,24 and the Environmental Protection Agency.25 Additionally, other excluded products were already
the subject of heavy federal regulation.26

C. Organization and Structure
The CPSC was designed to be run by five Commissioners,
one of which headed the agency as the Chairman.27 All of the Commissioners were to be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.28 Further, the CPSA disallowed the
20

Id. (By defining it in this all-encompassing manner, the CPSA
placed thousands of products under the jurisdiction of the CPSC.).
21
A Flawed Product, supra note 16, at 42-43.
22
Id. at 43.
23
Id.
24
See ATF History Timeline, ATF.GOV., https://www.atf.gov/ourhistory/atf-history-timeline (last accessed Oct. 20, 2017). (The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives was, at that time, just the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2003 the Bureau updated the
name to include Explosives.).
25
A Flawed Product, supra note 16, at 43. For a current list of items
outside of the CPSC jurisdiction, see Products Under the Jurisdiction of
Other Federal Agencies and Federal Links, US CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM’N, https://www.cpsc.gov/Regulations-Laws--Standards/ProductsOutside-CPSCs-Jurisdiction/ (last accessed Oct. 20, 2017).
26
Id.
27
The Consumer Product Safety Act, supra note 19 § at 4(a). Current
version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2053(a) (West 2011).
28
Id.
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CPSC from having more than three Commissioners from the same
political party and mandated that a Commissioner may not engage
in any other business or employment.29 The Chairman was to be
the principal executive officer of the CPSC, entrusted with total
executive power regarding the use and expenditure of funds, the
supervision of personnel, and the distribution of business among
personnel.30
Once elected, the Chairman was given the authority to appoint a variety of officers to join the Commission.31 The officer positions include the Executive Director, General Counsel, Director
of Engineering Services, and Director of Information.32 Additionally, the Chairman could appoint Associate Executive Directors to
head the CPSC’s various departments, including Administration,
Field Operations, and Administrative Litigation.33 The Chairman’s appointments for these positions were subject to the approval of the Commission.34 In addition to these personnel, Congress also allowed for a staff of 786 persons with a budget of $34.7
million.35 Despite many changes to the CPSC, this organizational
structure has remained largely intact throughout the years and will
be examined in Part III below.

D. Regulatory Duties and Powers
At its conception, the CPSC was equipped with a multitude
of regulatory duties and powers.36 It was required to collect and
maintain data relating to injuries and deaths associated with consumer products.37 It was also given the authority to conduct re-

29

See Id. § 4(c) current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2053(c) (West 2011).
See Id. § 4(f)(1) current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2053 (West 2011).
31
Id.
32
Id. § 4(g)(1).
33
Id. § 4(g)(2).
34
Id. § 4(g)(1).
35
Katrina Knutson, Lead in Their Shoes?: The Impact of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act on Chinese/American Trade Negotiations, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 705, 706 (2010) [hereinafter
“Lead In Their Shoes”].
36
The Consumer Product Safety Act, supra note 19.
37
Id. § 5(a)(1) current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2054(a) (West 2008).
30
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search, studies, and testing regarding the safety of consumer products.38 Further, the CPSC was given the authority to both recall,
and impose safety standards for, it’s regulated products.39
At the onset of the CPSA, the promulgation of mandatory
product safety standards appeared to be one of its major functions.40 In making these standards, the CPSA required the CPSC
to utilize persons outside of the agency to develop the initial safety
standards.41 Although this allowed a self-interested manufacturer
to create their own proposed safety standard, the CPSC could simultaneously develop its own proposed standard to ensure the safety
measures were adequate.42 This served the dual purpose of allowing businesses to self-regulate legitimately safe products, while
conserving regulatory power in the event the voluntary standard
was insufficient.43
II. AMENDING THE CPSA
Since its creation, the CPSA has undergone several amendments. Some of the most significant changes were those enacted
under the budget cutting Reagan administration in 1981, and in
response to large increases of recalled products in 2008.44 The 1981
amendments brought several limitations to the CPSC, and caused
a major shift in the CPSC by forcing it to rely on voluntary standards as opposed to issuing its own.45 In contrast, when Congress
38

Id. § 5(b).
Id. § 7(a).
40
Geraint Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability and
Product Safety —Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through a Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39
WASHBURN L.J. 305, 309 (2000) (providing a general explanation as to the
significance of mandatory standards in the conception of CPSC power).
41
Elliot Klayman, Standard Setting Under the Consumer Product
Safety Amendments of 1981 – A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 96, 101 (1982) [hereinafter “Standard Setting”].
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 98-99 (finding that the 1981 Amendments took away the authority and flexibility the CPSC originally possessed). See also Eileen Flaherty, Safety First: The Consumer Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 21
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 372, 390 (2009) [hereinafter “Safety First”].
45
See Pub. L. 97-35, August 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 703, § 7(b) [hereinafter
“The 1981 Amendments”] current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056 (West
1990).
39
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passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008,
they sought to increase the regulatory effectiveness of the CPSC.46

A. 1981 Amendments
In 1981, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety
Amendments of 1981 (the “Amendments”).47 These Amendments
brought many changes to the CPSC, starting with a significant decrease in size and budget.48 The Amendments mandated that the
CPSC was to rely on voluntary product safety standards and issue
mandatory standards only if the CPSC concluded that any proposals to develop voluntary standards would not adequately reduce risk of injury.49 This new mandate significantly curtailed the
CPSC’s ability to issue mandatory product safety standards, which
appeared to be the heart of the original Act.50
Under the Amendments, the CPSC was forced to rely on
voluntary standards or wait lengthy amounts of time for voluntary
standard proposals before imposing its own mandatory rule.51 This
allowed manufacturers to simply prolong negotiations with the
CPSC, or delay imposition of a voluntary standard to avoid cutting
costs.52 In its final report, the NCPS denounced voluntary standards as an unrealistic solution to the problem of product hazards
in the market.53 This shift was criticized for taking away significant
power from the CPSC.54 It is important to note that prior to these
Amendments, the CPSC had long encouraged voluntary industry

46

Safety First, supra note 44, at 372.
The 1981 Amendments, supra note 45, current version at 15
U.S.C.A. § 2053 (West 2008). Cf 15 U.S.C.A. § 2053 (West 1972) supra note
30.
48
Barry Meier, Product Safety Commission is Criticized as Too Slow
to
Act,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sep.
21,
1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/21/news/product-safety-commission-is-criticized-astoo-slow-to-act.html?pagewanted=all. (Under Reagan Administration the
CPSC’s budget was sharply cut. In 1991, the fiscal budget was $37 million,
down from $43.9 million in 1979) [hereinafter “Too Slow to Act”].
49
Standard Setting, supra note 41, at 100.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 102 (finding that some manufacturers will likely attempt to
delay or prolong negotiations to avoid heightened product costs).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 99. See also Pub. L. 90-146, supra note 15.
54
Id. at 98.
47
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standards as the most effective means of consumer protection.55
However, before the Amendments, the possibility of issuing mandatory standards incentivized manufacturers to both offer legitimate proposals of voluntary standards and to comply with those
standards.56
After these substantial changes, the CPSC faced a twofold
problem: (1) that an industry may propose inadequate voluntary
standards, or (2) that an industry would simply ignore these standards.57 The effects of these changes were significant: between 1978
and 1982, the rate of injuries per 100,000 Americans declined by
24%; but between 1982 and 1988 it only declined a mere 9%.58
Thus, by slashing the CPSC’s budget, staff, and regulatory powers,
the Amendments severely diminished the CPSC’s effectiveness, allowing many dangerous products to enter the public stream of
commerce.59

B. Consumer Product Improvement Act of 2008
In 2008, in response to rising consumer hazards, Congress
passed the Consumer Product Improvement Act of 2008 (the
“CPSIA”).60 This was largely in response to an especially burdensome recall year in 2007, which some dubbed “the year of the recall.”61 In 2007, there were a record 473 recalls by the CPSC alone,
with an estimated 30 million potentially hazardous children’s toys
pulled from the stream of commerce.62 Interestingly, unlike most
prior years, in 2007 the products recalled included both inexpensive products and high-end brands alike.63 Many of these toys came
from China,64 implicating international concerns which will be addressed in Part III below.

55

Id. at 101.
Id.
57
Id. at 100.
58
Too Slow to Act, supra note 48.
59
See Id.
60
The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA), U.S.
CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N., https://www.cpsc.gov/RegulationsLaws--Standards/Statutes/The-Consumer-Product-Safety-ImprovementAct/ (last accessed Oct. 20, 2017).
61
Lead In Their Shoes, supra note 35, at 380.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
56
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When these hazards began garnering national attention,
Congress responded by passing the CPSIA, in a bipartisan effort.65
The CPSIA was designed to overhaul the CPSC by releasing safer
products for consumers, particularly children’s products.66 This
overhaul created new regulatory duties, expanded on prior powers,
and increased both the staff size and budget of the CPSC.67 In order
to foster public outreach, the CPSIA created an online database
which allowed consumers to access reports of injuries and deaths
associated with consumer products.68 This database was useful as
it provided consumers, particularly parents, with a simple way to
determine whether a product or toy they purchased was potentially
hazardous.69
Another significant change was to expand the CPSC’s authority to ban products from the stream of commerce. After the
CPSIA, when the CPSC was confronted with a substantially hazardous product, the CPSC could order the manufacturer to cease
distribution of the product, notify all sellers to cease distribution,
or notify each known purchaser of the substantial risk.70 The CPSC
would first have to afford the parties a hearing before issuing an
order.71 Nevertheless, this expansion of authority was crucial, as it
allowed the CPSC to ban products from public consumption after
they were identified to be substantially risky, or to otherwise notify
consumers so they could take proper action, as opposed to issuing
a mandatory recall.72 This was of particular importance, as issuing
a mandatory recall required the CPSC to first file an action in district court against the manufacturer or product.73
The CPSC was also given expanded powers when regulating products deemed to be “imminently hazardous,” which were

65

Safety First, supra note 44, at 372.
Id.
67
Id. at 386.
68
15 U.S.C.A. § 2055(a) (West 2008) current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §
2055(a) (West 2011).
69
The CPSC Online Database, supra note 8, at 260.
70
International Quarterly, Requirements Under the CPSIA, 22 NO. 4
INTL. QUARTERLY ART 2010 [hereinafter “International Quarterly”]. (the
CPSIA expanded the definition of “substantial product hazard” to include
failing to comply with a similar rule under any CPSC enforced act). See
also 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(c)(1) (West 2008).
71
15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(f) (West 2008).
72
15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(c)(1) (West 2008).
73
§ 2061, supra note 10.
66
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reaffirmed under the CPSIA.74 The legislature defined an imminently hazardous product as “a consumer product which presents
imminent and unreasonable risk of death, serious illness, or severe
personal injury,” thus providing the CPSC with heightened authority to regulate products that are especially dangerous and not
merely risky.75 When a product is determined to be imminently
hazardous, the CPSC can file an action against the manufacturer
and seek a variety of judicial orders.76 Similar to its ability to regulate substantial risks, the CPSC can pray for judicial relief in the
form of notifying purchasers or the public of the product risk, repairing or replacing the product, refunding the product, or recalling the product.77 Therefore, the CPSC was given the authority
to constrain sales of substantially risky products, and had the ability to seek judicial approval for a mandatory product recall in the
event those products were determined to be imminently hazardous.78
The CPSIA also provided a variety of other changes which
would prove beneficial. The bill authorized CPSC funding, nearly
doubling the funding it received prior to the bill’s passing.79 Additionally, the CPSC could require a manufacturer of a substantially
risky product to repair the product or issue a refund to those who
purchased it.80 Similar to the CPSC’s power to ban products, this
requirement can only be imposed after affording an opportunity
for a hearing.81 The CPSA also required manufacturers of children’s toys to certify that their toys were tested by a credible third
party, in compliance with the applicable standards.82 All of these
changes remain largely in effect today.

74

15 U.S.C.A. § 2061 (West 1990), cf. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064 (West 2008).
15 U.S.C.A. § 2061(a) (West 1990).
76
Id. § 2061(b).
77
Id. § 2061(b)(1).
78
The CPSC Online Database, supra note 8, at 257.
79
The CPSC Online Database, supra note 8, at 260.
80
15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(d)(1) (West 2008).
81
International Quarterly, supra note 70.
82
15 U.S.C.A. § 2063(a)(2) (West 2008). This does not confer authority
to the CPSC to test these products.
75
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III. CPSC TODAY – LIMITATIONS, EFFECTS AND CRITICISMS

A. The CPSC Today
Today, the CPSC’s commission consists of Chairman Ann
Buerkle and Commissioners Robert Adler, Marietta Robinson, Elliott Kaye, and Joseph Mohorovic.83 It is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, and has regional offices in Chicago, New York,
Washington D.C. and California.84 According to the CPSC’s most
recent census employee survey, the staff size is currently 491 persons.85 In 2016, Congress appropriated $125 million to the CPSC’s
budget.86 Although the staff size has increased since 2008, this
amount is still significantly less than the 786 employees initially
provided for by Congress in passing the CPSA in 1972.87
Under the CPSIA, the penalties for violating the CPSA increased from a maximum of $8,000 to $100,000 for an individual
violation.88 Additionally, these fines were raised for manufacturers
who commit a series of violations, with a maximum civil penalty
of $15 million.89 Today, the CPSC can impose broader penalties on
manufacturers who violate safety standards, thereby deterring
noncompliance with such standards. In terms of public outreach,
the CPSC has expanded its capabilities with the creation of its
online database and use of the Internet and social media to inform
83

Commissioner Biographies, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM’N, https://www.cpsc.gov/About-CPSC/Commissioners (last accessed Oct. 19, 2017); See also Chairman, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM’N,
https://www.cpsc.gov/About-CPSC/Chairman/BuerkleBiography (last accessed Oct. 12, 2017).
84
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), CONSUMER
SERVICES
GUIDE,
http://www.consumerservicesguide.org/articles/csg_consumer_product_safety_commission_cpsc (last accessed Oct.
12, 2017).
85
2017 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, U.S. CONSUMER PROD.
SAFETY COMM’N, https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/2017FederalEmployeeViewpointSurveyResults.pdf.pdf?JuEQ2qNr2V2cUcfKreF4GskRXg52f8eq.
86
Agency Financial Report, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM’N, https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/2016AgencyFinancialReportFinal1.pdf. (Nov. 15, 2016).
87
Id.
88
International Quarterly, supra note 70.
89
See Id. (this was a significant raise from the prior amount of $1.825
million).
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consumers of high-risk products.90 Despite these advances, the
CPSC is still plagued with many shortcomings which hinder its
ability to advance its mission.

B. Improper Reliance on Voluntary Standards
The CPSC still relies on voluntary standards, as first prescribed under the 1981 Amendments.91 This reliance is contrary to
the findings of the NCPS, which led to the establishment of the
CPSC.92 The CPSC has taken the position that voluntary standards are faster and cheaper than mandatory standards, while offering similar protections.93 However, reliance on these standards
poses several issues.
First, as a practical matter, reliance on voluntary standards
gives the self-interested manufacturer the power to control the
quality and extent of a product’s safety features, as they are the
ones primarily tasked with developing the voluntary standard.94
Although the CPSC has to approve voluntary standards, this still
places the manufacturer in a better position to circumvent safety
measures in lieu of lower costs.95 Furthermore, developing these
standards typically involves a lengthy process that can take
months or even years.96 However, until a safety standard is in existence, the CPSC is unable to impose a mandatory standard unless
it determines that compliance with a voluntary standard would not
eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury.97 This approach
renders the CPSC virtually powerless until such time as the proposed voluntary standard comes into fruition.98
It is true that the CPSC may promulgate a mandatory ban
on certain products that are deemed hazardous, even in the absence of a standard.99 Yet this power is only operational in the
event the product is so dangerous that no feasible voluntary or

90

Recall Handbook, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, at 1819 (Mar. 2012), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/8002.pdf.
91
Too Slow to Act, supra note 48.
92
Standard Setting, supra note 41.
93
The CPSC Online Database, supra note 8, at 263.
94
Standard Setting, supra note 41, at 101.
95
Id.
96
The CPSC Online Database, supra note 8, at 264.
97
15 U.S.C.A. § 2056 (West 1990).
98
Standard Setting, supra note 41.
99
15 U.S.C.A. § 2057 (West 1981).
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mandatory standard would adequately protect the public from an
unreasonable risk of injury.100 Consequently, many potentially
hazardous products may still be sold to consumers while awaiting
voluntary standard development, many of which are moderately
risky and could feasibly become safer with the issuance of a voluntary or mandatory safety standard.101 Moreover, while the CPSC
still retains the ability to ban products that are “substantially”102 or
“imminently”103 hazardous, this retrospective power still allows for
hazardous products to slip through the cracks and into the hands
of consumers.104 These shortcomings have led some scholars to
view the regulatory state of products liability as being, “treated
with kid gloves.”105

C. International Concerns
Perhaps the most challenging issue of the CPSC today lies
in the international concerns involving foreign manufacturers,
particularly those in China. In 2008, when the CPSC documented
a record 563 voluntary recalls, 85% of these products were imported, with a majority of the imports coming from China.106 As
one scholar wrote, “without question, the CPSIA owes its very existence to the failures of American toy designers, Chinese toy man-

100

Id.
Id.
102
15 U.S.C.A. § 2064 (West 2008).
103
15 U.S.C.A. § 2061 (West 1990).
104
CPSC Sues Star Networks USA Over Hazardous, High-Powered
Magnetic Balls and Cubes, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
https://www.cpsc.gov/content/cpsc-sues-star-networks-usa-over-hazardous-high-powered-magnetic-balls-and-cubes (last accessed Nov. 5, 2017)
[hereinafter “CPSC Sues Star Networks”]. (In 2012 for example, the CPSC
sued several manufacturers of children’s magnets seeking a mandatory recall after repeated children’s injuries. One manufacturer previously
agreed to issue a voluntary recall, but then reversed its decision and refused to comply with the CPSC’s voluntary request.).
105
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for
Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (2010).
106
Scott D. McBride, Something Wicked This Way Comes: The
United States Government’s Response to Unsafe Imported Chinese Toys
and Subsidized Chinese Exports, 45 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 233, 237 (2009) [hereinafter “Something Wicked This Way Comes”].
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ufacturers, and to a certain extent, the Chinese government’s ineffective enforcement of its laws.”107 It is important to note that the
CPSC is not the only agency that struggles with these international
concerns.108
One issue affecting the CPSC regarding Chinese manufacturing is the simple fact that the CPSC has no statutory authority
to force Chinese factories to open their doors to U.S. inspectors.109
Without being able to physically inspect the premises, it is almost
impossible to effectively regulate these products, as it is unknown
whether or not the products were made in compliance with the applicable voluntary or mandatory safety standards.110 In essence,
absent some sort of physical, overseas presence, it is simply impossible to provide the same level of risk management that could be
provided from a U.S. manufacturer.111
Another issue is that the CPSC lacks the manpower to staff
permanent, full-time inspectors at all U.S. ports receiving foreign
consumer imports.112 Notably, in 2009 the CPSC only had a presence inspecting imported consumer products at nine out of 326
ports granting entry to products into the U.S.113 The CPSC does
not independently test these imports as they come in, which means
the consumer must essentially rely on good-faith assurances from
foreign manufacturers that the products being imported were produced under applicable safety standards. This belief is based on
limited assurances of actual proof.114 Because of the mass amounts
of imports coming in from foreign manufacturers, particularly
China, this poses a demonstrable problem to the CPSC’s mission.
Without more proactive measures, the CPSC is only able to effectively regulate hazardous foreign products after they are already in
the stream of commerce.
107

Id. at 236.
Kayla Webley, List of Problem Chinese Imports Grows, NPR.ORG.
(Jul. 10, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11656278. (At this time the FDA had a similar Chinese-product recall experience, recalling among other things, certain fish, pet food, and
toothpaste.).
109
Something Wicked This Way Comes, supra note 106, at 236.
110
Id. at 246.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 247.
113
Id.
114
Id. (Although for children’s toys the CPSC now requires mandatory
third-party testing, it still does not provide for independent testing. See id.
at 251-252.).
108
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D. Public Risk and Effects
Products regulated by the CPSC pose significant effects on
the public. For example, the CPSC estimates that the deaths, injuries and property damage associated with consumer products cost
the nation over $1 trillion per year.115 Every year since 1985, the
number of deaths associated with consumer products reaches the
thousands.116 Between October of 2014 and September of 2015,
there was an estimated 11.6 million people who received emergency medical treatment for injuries associated with the use of consumer products.117 These statistics do not necessarily mean that the
injuries or deaths were caused by defective or hazardous products,
but nonetheless illustrate the significance that consumer products
have on the public’s well-being.118
The number of products that have been recalled remains
consistently high. In 2016, for example, the CPSC effectuated 428
recalls,119 100% of which were voluntarily completed by the manufacturers in cooperation with the CPSC.120 This finding suggests
that while mandatory recalls are an important power, in most cases
manufacturers are willing to comply with the CPSC and issue a
voluntary recall if a product has a legitimate defect or otherwise
presents a substantial risk to the public. With the implementation
of increased penalties, manufacturers are more likely to cooperate
with the CPSC.121 However, it is important to note that in the fu-

115

CPSC About Page, supra note 2.
2016 Annual Report to the President and Congress, U.S.
CONSUMER
PROD.
SAFETY
COMM’N
(2016),
at
3,
https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/CPSC_FY16_Annual_Report.pdf?DsHsl4ravzs3IcO8aSlqcVEda06m
7d_X. [hereinafter “Final Report”]. (According to the CPSC’s Annual Report to Congress, in 2013 there were 3,990 deaths related to consumer
products.) See Consumer Product-Related Injuries and Deaths in the
United States: Estimated Injuries Occurring in 2010 and Estimated
Deaths Occurring in 2008, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N (Feb.
2012), at 7, https://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/134720/2010injury.pdf
117
Final Report, supra note 116, at 6.
118
Id. (The Final Report is based on injuries associated with product
liability, not necessarily caused by them.).
119
Id. at 18.
120
Id.
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Id. at 20. (The CPSC also accepted four civil penalty settlements
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ture, manufacturers may still refuse to implement voluntary recalls, which could result in lengthy judicial battles to determine
whether the product(s) should be recalled.122
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The effects of dangerous consumer products entering the
stream of commerce are significant. In order to effectively regulate
consumer products, the CPSC must be given appropriate tools and
authority to achieve its mission. Similarly, the CPSC must also be
given an increased staff and budget in order to properly maintain
a safe consumer market.

A. Reliance on Mandatory Standards
This Note proposes a solution to grant the CPSC the authority to impose mandatory safety standards, subject to certain
distinctions. First, the same organizations and manufacturers who
develop voluntary product standards today will still be afforded
the opportunity to present such standards to the CPSC. However,
in order to avoid lengthy proposals, cost-cutting, or other potential
limitations, the CPSC should have the authority to propose its own
mandatory rule before a voluntary standard is developed. In preparing these mandatory rules, the CPSC should rely on assistance
from outside organizations and manufacturers. However, it should
be clear that the CPSC does not need to rely on these voluntary
proposals, and should have the independent authority to promulgate its own rules. This was a crucial function of the CPSC under
the findings of the NPSC which led to its founding and it should
be restored to its original purpose.123
In order to maintain a proper balance between regulatory
authority and economic growth, manufacturers should have the
right to petition the CPSC and present their own voluntary standards. These voluntary standards could then replace the CPSC’s
own standards in the event the CPSC determined them to be sufficiently safe. Under this arrangement, manufacturers would retain the ability to implement cost-saving measures regarding their
products, while ensuring that the products are safe for the public.

from manufacturers in 2016, totaling roughly $28 million).
122
CPSC Sues Star Networks, supra note 104.
123
Standard Setting, supra note 41, at 99.
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In the event the CPSC found the voluntary standard to be insufficient, or if the manufacturer believed a CPSC standard to be overbearing or excessive, the legislature could provide an avenue for
the manufacturer to file an action in federal court to seek judicial
review. Then, the judiciary would have the ability to assess
whether the voluntary standard presented by the manufacturer
was adequately safe such that it could replace the CPSC’s standard. Alternatively, the judiciary could determine whether a CPSC
standard was overbearing in light of other, more efficient standards that have been proposed by the industry. In either case, the
goals of the regulatory scheme are being fulfilled: the products are
ensured safe, and the businesses may still implement cost-saving
strategies. The distinction is that this regulatory balance correctly
places the burden on the manufacturer rather than the regulatory
agency.124

B. Foreign Inspections in Major Chinese Factories
As discussed above, a major shortcoming associated with
consumer products liability in the United States is a result of foreign imports, such as China.125 To combat this issue, this Note proposes two changes. The first is for Congress to grant the CPSC the
authority to inspect certain Chinese manufacturers or factories.
The second is to adequately staff personnel at ports which receive
imports of consumer products from foreign nations.
By allowing the CPSC to conduct testing of Chinese factories, it is likely that the number of recalls would decrease significantly. Due to the international jurisdictional concerns, a measure
of this magnitude would likely need to be implemented in conjunction with the Chinese government.126 This would require Congress
or the Executive Branch to work with China in implementing this
measure, as it would necessarily involve CPSC personnel gaining
entry onto Chinese soil, and specific manufacturer’s facilities. It
would also undoubtedly require coordination and agreement between both governments as to the number of authorized personnel
allowed for inspection, the limits of the inspector’s authority and
scope of their entry, and a scheme for determining which factories
124

Id.
Something Wicked This Way Comes, supra note 106, at 237.
126
Lead in Their Shoes, supra note 35, at 732. (The US government
must determine the best course of action to invite Chinese cooperation to
resolve the problem of harmful foreign consumer products.).
125
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to inspect. However, given that such a large number of recalls involve Chinese products, there is no reason to not undertake this
effort.127
Another concern is the fact that it would be impossible for
the CPSC to visit every single foreign manufacturing facility.128
With this in mind, it would be sensible to base inspections on a
manufacturer’s prior product defects, the number of units entering
the stream of commerce from that factory, or particularly risky
products such as children’s toys.129 It is interesting that the CPSIA
was passed largely in response to hazardous Chinese toys, and yet
the legislature failed to adequately address the specific issue of foreign manufacturers in their overhaul.130 Although the overhaul required third-party testing for children’s toys, it still did not provide
for independent testing which gives manufacturers considerable
leeway in achieving compliance.131 What is more interesting is that
imports from Chinese manufacturers actually increased in 2008.132
By maintaining a general, or even minimal presence in Chinese
factories, it would incentivize compliance with standards, as noncompliance could otherwise result in strict penalties.133 In short, an
overseas presence would make foreign manufacturer‘s compliance
with CPSC standards cheaper, more convenient, or both.

C. Sample Testing at Port
The second important solution is to increase CPSC personnel at ports which receive foreign shipments of consumer products.
Before allowing these products into the stream of commerce, certain reasonable testing should be applied at port to prevent such
basic and hazardous issues like lead paint on children’s toys.134
This is not to suggest that testing should be mandatory on every
single shipment of goods, however, reasonable sample testing

127

Id.
Id. at 265.
129
Id.
130
Lead In Their Shoes, supra note 35, at 734. (“[A] domestic law has
little impact overseas without an agreement to enforce its provisions.”).
131
15 U.S.C.A. § 2063(a)(2) (West 2008). (Testing of children’s toys requires a third party to issue a certificate that the product conforms to all
applicable rules.).
132
Id. at 271.
133
International Quarterly, supra note 70.
134
Something Wicked This Way Comes, supra note 106, at 239.
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would ensure a minimal degree of safety, while simultaneously incentivizing manufacturers to comply with the enacted standards.135
If they failed the inspection, the goods would have to be sent back
or could be halted at port until a more thorough examination could
be conducted depending on the results of the inspection.
Reasonable sample testing of foreign products would likely
decrease the number of manufacturing defects that enter the U.S.
consumer market. Many of the product recalls from foreign countries are the result of a manufacturing defect, as opposed to a design flaw.136 Thus the hazardous products which have historically
entered our consumer market could have theoretically been detected beforehand with sample testing, which would send a clear
message to manufacturers to stop trying to outwit the system and
instead produce safe products.137

D. Increase Staff and Budget
The final, and perhaps most crucial solution, is to further
increase the staff and budget of the CPSC in order to carry out the
aforementioned changes. When founded, the CPSC had a staff that
was roughly one and a half times larger than that of today. Thus,
despite the CPSIA overhaul, the limited budget and staff concerns
that were implemented in the 1981 Amendments still appear to be
alive today. Simply put, in order to effectively regulate the consumer market, the CPSC needs more staff.
The CPSC regulates over 15,000 products.138 Yet with a
staff of roughly 500, the agency is unable to adequately address all
of these products.139 The same budgetary and personnel issues have
plagued the CPSC throughout its history.140 Between regulating
their website, responding to consumer and manufacturer reports,

135

Id.
See Id. (A manufacturing defect generally means the product is defective because of the way in which it was produced. A design defect on
the other hand, means the product is defective because of the way in which
it is designed.).
137
Id. at 241.
138
The CPSC Online Database, supra note 8, at 257.
139
See Id. at 258 (Quoting former Chariman Inez Tenenbaum as saying “the continued lack of sufficient funding and staff was beginning to
make it nearly impossible for the [CPSC] to accomplish even the minimum
that is required of a health and safety agency.”).
140
Id.
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assessing and imposing recalls, working with manufacturers to develop voluntary standards, and their other various duties, the
CPSC does not have the ability to adequately regulate the consumer market.
CONCLUSION
Over time, the CPSC has proved itself an invaluable public
agency for detecting and removing dangerous products from public use. Despite the apparent increases in power granted in the
CPSIA of 2008, the CPSC is still inundated with many issues that
legislation simply has not addressed. Particularly troubling is the
CPSC’s forced reliance on voluntary standards as opposed to mandatory standards. Furthermore, the hazards from risky products
coming from foreign manufacturers have increased with little potential for adequate change under the current regulatory scheme.
Absent additional powers, the CPSC is limited to a reactive approach in dealing with these risky products, which causes risk of
injury or death to the U.S. consumer. In short, the CPSC is a necessary and beneficial agency. Congress should simply give it the
tools it needs to effectively regulate the consumer market.

